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This project attempts to untangle the root causes for the Syrian uprisings in 2011. It briefly presents relevant 
events and analyses underlying political and economic processes. It then discusses these findings in relation 
to relevant arguments in the literature on the Syrian uprising. The project argues that economically and 
politically exclusionary regime tendencies have caused an erosion of the social contract, which laid the 
foundation for the uprising in Syria. Character Count: 77,620 
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The Syrian Uprising 
1) Introduction 
In December 2010, the Tunisian fruit vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi committed suicide by self-
immolation. Bouazizi’s death sparked protests across North African and West Asian countries, 
igniting what would be dubbed the Arab Spring. Syria, however, was by many thought immune to 
these upheavals (Ahmari 2015). In January 2011, Bashar al Asad, in an interview with the Wall 
Street Journal, guaranteed that there was little risk of the so-called Arab Spring spreading to Syria, 
pointing out his progressive reforms and his shared visions for upgrading Syria (Wall Street Journal 
2011). 
However, two months later, 15 teenagers were arrested and tortured for anti-government 
graffiti in the Syrian city of Dar’a, triggering protests across the country (Fahim, Saad 2013), with 
violent government crackdowns. The Syrian uprisings would gradually evolve into one of the most 
brutal civil wars and most exposed humanitarian disasters of the 21st century (The Economist 
2015). The project of upgrading Syria, which Bashar al Asad had hoped would restore the economy 
and his popularity, appeared as a failure. 
 
1.1) Project Problem Area and Delimitation 
The aim of this project is to attempt to untangle the permissive conditions, or underlying causes, for 
the Syrian uprisings. 
Confrontation within societies can derive from a broad spectrum of variables and is seldom 
satisfactorily explained by mono-causal approaches. In a complex and deeply rooted conflict such 
as the Syrian uprising, a multitude of arguments have potential explanatory value. For this reason, 
as well as in consideration of the spatial limitations and necessary parsimony, the project is 
primarily confined to the underlying domestic politico-economic causes of the Syrian uprising. 
Consequently, explanations emphasising transnational movements and external influence, theories 
of ethnic and sectarian hatred, as well as potential reasons found in Islamic doctrine are only briefly 
mentioned. Furthermore, the Kurdish areas of Syria are disregarded, as they are essentially occupied 
non-citizens (Yildiz 2005:94-96). 
    As in the literature review, the point of departure is with explanations based on concerns of 
politico-economic nature. The roles of inequality in conflict and redistribution in securing political 
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power are recurring themes. This is underpinned by theories showing that these two concerns can 
only superficially be separated. Using the literature review, as a point of departure, the following 
guiding hypothesis has been derived:  
 
The Syrian uprising of 2011 was caused by exclusionary regime politics that created permissive 
conditions for group mobilisation and conflict. 
 
The project seeks to isolate independent and dependent variables and uncover the extents of their 
influence on the Syrian revolution. The project’s independent variable is increasingly exclusionary 
regime politics. The dependent variable is the presence of permissive conditions for group 
mobilisation and uprisings. 
The isolation of root causes is accomplished through a review of Syrian history with the 
point of departure in the French colonial era and with a specific narrowing focus on the period 
between 2000 and 2011. In order for this project to have the ability to draw on different analytical 
aspects in different time periods, a deductive approach has been applied. The project is based on a 
hypothesis which through the deductive approach aims to confirm or reject the hypothesis claim 
presented earlier.  
This hypothesis is tested in three steps. The fourth chapter narrates Syrian history in terms of 
political and economic characteristics, reaching its very beginnings, but focusing on the period from 
the 1980s until 2011. In chapter five the political process causing the erosion of the social contract 
and the opportunity structure for the Syrian uprising are analysed using theory. The sixth chapter 
discusses the role of exclusionary regime politics in terms of alternative explanatory modes and 
thereby allows for the evaluation of the hypothesis. As the timeframe of the project ends with the 
beginning of the uprisings, the subsequent civil war is excluded from the analysis. However, some 
of the political implications of the project’s findings will briefly be discussed following the 
conclusion. 
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2) Methods 
2.1) General Approach 
The research for the project has been conducted using different qualitative methods and a limited 
amount of quantitative methods in the form of a statistical output from a social network analysis, 
which will be elaborated on below.  
The project primarily relies on secondary sources, many of which are referred to in the 
literature review. This material is used for empirical claims used in explaining, analysing and 
discussing the topic. The materials include academic renderings, unanalysed statistical information 
and news reports. Using primary sources, such as conducting interviews, surveys and independent 
observation, is left out because of the limited scope of the project, for which sufficient empirical 
claims and theories are found in the selected material. However, other primary sources, such as 
accessible European Union sanction lists, provide useful information in identifying Syrian actors 
and companies. This information is needed to gain an overview of the regime’s insider network, and 
thus to conduct a network analysis. The project has also used reports from think-tanks and 
newspaper articles; these serve to derive an impression on popular explanatory approaches. The 
majority of sources, however, are from international journals and have been obtained through 
various databases such as Scopus, SocIndex and the International Bibliography of Social Sciences.  
The project relies on both quantitative and qualitative information in constructing a heuristic 
impression of societal stratification and its development in Syria. It is to be mentioned that the main 
contribution of empirical material derives from qualitative sources. This strategy may be described 
as a mixed-method approach. Triangulation of secondary material, described by Alan Bryman as 
“the use of more than one method or source of data in the study of a social phenomenon so that 
findings may be cross-checked” (2012:629,717) is the key method of source evaluation. 
In the project it has been problematic to gain access to quantitative empirical data. The 
strong control exercised by the Syrian government over public information render official 
quantitative material questionable and limits non-state actors’ ability to collect such information. 
However, triangulation of sources, including official Syrian outlets and the Department of 
Development at Oxford University, may establish a degree of reliability for figures, although they 
do not contain enough data to make it feasible to conduct any inferential statistical analysis. An 
example of the infeasibility of inferential statistics is provided by conflicting descriptions of the 
development of wheat production that can be found in the literature.  
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Analytical devices employed in the qualitative methodological approach are a literature 
review, document analysis and a network analysis centered on Bashar al Asad. Due to the insecurity 
concerning the quantitative data the project will put most emphasis on these qualitative data. 
 
2.2) Literature Review 
A literature review is a collection of different literature within a specific topic seeking to give an 
overview of, compare and analyse the research within an academic field (Bryman 2012:713). Thus, 
the literature review written for this project has been created in order to clarify, analyse and 
synthesise the respective approaches provided by different scholars in the conflict development 
literature. Most literature gathered in the literature review is qualitative and provides a 
comprehensive overview of the existing literature and how to apply it to the Syrian case. Through 
the project's hypothesis, the accumulation of literature seeks to assess the degree of validity of the 
hypothesis. The literature accumulated includes books and journal articles which are all considered 
secondary sources. 
 
2.3) Document Analysis 
The project uses document analysis to elaborate on chosen sources and empirical data. The 
selection of empirical data such as documents has been chosen with the criteria of being relevant to 
the field with which the project is concerned. It is through this approach that the project identifies 
which factors have and have not been significant to the Syrian uprising. The project uses the 
findings in the documents to give a picture of how Syria was structured and what changes occurred 
leading up to the uprising. The documents used have been collected through the snowball method 
(Lynggaard 2014:141), meaning that a small number of documents created the inspiration and 
curiosity for further research. 
 
2.4) Network Analysis 
Official sanction directives from the EU and the US have been subjected to document analysis in 
order to solidify the network analysis. Social network analysis (SNA) applied to the Syrian power 
nexus emphasises concerns with clientelist governance methods, particularly in the context of 
economic reforms, of which Bashar al Asad’s political allies have been the primary beneficiaries 
(Haddad 2012; Hinnebusch 2012). The reasoning behind the focus on the center of power rather 
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than the periphery is its weight in shaping and directing policy in its own favour, which can be 
attributed some degree of causal relevance. Within network analysis there are several ‘kinds’ of 
networks. Among these are the study of so-called governance networks and policy networks. A 
governance network is defined as a “... relative[ly] stable horizontal articulation of interdependent, 
but operationally autonomous actors ...” (Sørensen, Torfing 2007:9). A policy network is the 
network of interdependent groups of actors, who informally affect policy. What is studied is thus 
the policy networks of Bashar al Asad, helping to uncover the “... shadow structure of interests 
which affects policy-making” (Chatzopoulou, Lewis 2015:168). It is analysing the networks, 
formally and informally, of those who are participating in the decision-making process 
(Chatzopoulou, Lewis 2015). Of interest is thus not just the  question of whose interests are 
favoured by the decisions taken within the network, but whose are excluded from them. As is 
explained in the theory section, these forms of networks may well be considered institutions - albeit 
informal ones. 
Due to various constraints, the network analysis consists of connected relevant individuals. 
The focus on individuals rather than institutions has the benefit of allowing for the structure of 
informal networks to emerge in the analysis. An important advantage of network analysis is its 
strength in visualising and statistically pinpointing the power nexus. Sevasti Chatzopoulou and 
Jenny Lewis point out that this approach might be more reliable than a descriptive account 
(2015:181). 
A disadvantage of a network analysis is the difficulty in properly identifying all actors and 
relationships. In this project, this may very well be an issue. In order to overcome this issue, the 
SNA will only establish ties between two agents if they are either related or are regularly meeting 
for work-related purposes, such as co-owning a company, sitting in the same advisory board etc., or 
if they are related by either blood or family. By using such specific criteria for defining what 
constitutes a ‘tie’ between two actors, the project may overlook important connections. However, 
these criteria are also safeguards against claiming connections that do not actually exist. Although 
taking this approach, the network is still quite connected, due to the fact that large parts of the 
network consists of members and relatives of the al Asad family. 
Furthermore, it is also a challenge that many public and private sector documents in Syria 
are not available online anymore. Additionally, the exact geographical location of meetings between 
these actors are impossible to discern, as the Syrian government produces little public information. 
These are some of the reasons that documents from EU bodies and the US government are used to 
Page 7 of 42 
 
conduct the network analysis. These documents are used to compile a list of actors within the 
Syrian governance network. Following the establishment of actors within the network, it is analysed 
using the SNA tool UCINET. UCINET contains various quantitative measures for analysing the 
power held by actors within a network. Two such measures are the betweenness measure or the in-
degree centrality measure. These are used to indicate the strategic position of actors within the 
network, as well as the degree of connectedness (Chatzopoulou, Lewis 2015:172). Due to all the 
constraints mentioned in this paragraph, the importance of the SNA to the project’s argument 
should not be overstrained and for this reason the importance of such statistical outputs have not 
been emphasised. Instead, the aim of using SNA is to provide an analysis based on specific people, 
rather than making an argument about Syria’s policy networks in general terms. This adds an 
important dimension to the argument as specific actors and their actions determine the outcomes 
produced within structural constraints. 
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3) Theory 
3.1) Theoretical Framework 
Theory serves as a lense of understanding, and a tool for explanation. As such it is crucial to this 
project that it enables an understanding of social stratification and the forces governing political 
action in Syria. The project’s theoretical framework seeks to establish connections between the 
different selected theories. The theory chapter gives a picture of how the theories complement each 
other. 
 
3.2) Class and Social Contract 
Even though the causal argument made in this project does not rely on notions of inter-class forces, 
class as a concept still offers a good approach to understanding the historical and contextual 
dynamics underlying recent events in Syria. Haddad, in his book on Syria’s political economy,  
defines class as a stratified group order based on objective social-structural factors that may be used 
to qualify estimations of interests ascribed to individuals (2012:35). Class thus serves as a 
cornerstone in creating an organised understanding of socially and structurally stratified group 
positions that are the point of departure for actors. Classes and their relations should, for reasons 
clarified in the next chapter, be understood as emerging from historic situations. Individual actions 
are thus embedded in the historical and organic context of the entirety of society and the 
institutionalised frames of behaviour. 
The order of a class system may best be described by the notion of a social contract. A 
social contract is a necessity for social stability (Heywood 2013:60-61). This line of argument goes 
back to Thomas Hobbes, who argued for the existence of a contract between a state and its citizens: 
the citizens give sovereignty to the state and in return, they receive certain public goods (Hobbes 
1651). Through this approach, as Hobbes puts it, a system avoids the so-called ‘state of nature’ 
where anarchy reigns and life is “nasty, brutish and short”. (1651:75) 
More recently, Graham Brown and Frances Stewart have described this theory: “According 
to this (hypothetical) contract [the social contract], people accept state authority as long as the 
state delivers services and provides reasonable economic conditions in terms of employment and 
incomes.” (Brown, Stewart 2015:208). It thus follows that if the state does not deliver basic 
services, and does not provide reasonable economic conditions, people are less likely to accept state 
authority. The ability or inability of states to cope with such issues, or the driving impetus of 
ignoring them, may have been determined where power is located. 
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3.3) Institutionalism 
The project’s understanding of the aforementioned political processes largely focuses on the role of 
informal institutions (i.e. networks). Hence, the projects way of theorising the issues of the 
hypothesis, could be labelled as what political scientists call new institutionalist (Hall, Taylor 
1996). New institutionalism comes in different forms: Rational choice institutionalism, using a neo-
classical economical conceptual framework to describe political institutions; sociological 
institutionalism, focusing on cultural practices of institutions; and historical institutionalism, which 
often emphasize the development of institution in a more context-specific path-dependent manner 
(Hall, Taylor 1996). The theory applied to this project will take the latter approach, as it analyses 
the structures of institutions, and the structures that make up the context in which these institutions 
exist rather than the norms, cultural traits etc. (Hall, Taylor 1996). The project thus takes the term 
institution to mean “... formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded 
in the polity or political economy ...” (Hall, Taylor 1996:938). 
 
3.4) Neo-patrimonial Authoritarianism 
In order to understand the role of political processes and informal institutions in eroding the social 
contract of Syria, the project applies Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol’s theory of social revolutions 
in the contemporary third world (1994). 
One important factor in the creation of a revolution is the political space that a regime makes 
available to revolutionary movements. The narrower a coalition the regime represents, the broader a 
potential coalition against that regime could become (Goodwin, Skocpol 1994). 
Revolutionary movements do not form in a vacuum, but in specific political contexts. These 
political contexts are often exclusionary and authoritarian as well as organisationally weak. For this 
reason, democratic countries and so-called inclusionary authoritarian regimes are less likely to 
experience large-scale revolutionary uprisings (Goodwin, Skocpol 1994:265) Civilians within the 
latter group may not enjoy civil liberties, but still enjoy a strong social contract. In such countries, 
bargaining between various groups and some degree of institutional management of grievances are 
undertaken. Furthermore, people enjoy a decent degree of access to goods and benefits, often 
because of strong growth patterns (Goodwin, Skocpol 1994:265). 
Unlike their inclusionary counterparts, exclusionary regimes are unwilling and/or unable to 
mobilise various social groups and instead allow all benefits of power to be absorbed by those who 
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rule (Goodwin, Skocpol 1994:274). The economic and political exclusion that this creates becomes 
politicised very quickly, as political power is needed to exert power over the market. (Goodwin, 
Skocpol 1994:266). 
Furthermore, closed authoritarian regimes have a number of tendencies. First, they tend to 
marginalise their moderate critics, thereby radicalising their opponents. Secondly, due to their 
lacking legitimacy they tend to be a highly visible center of attention for grievances. Third, such 
regimes are more likely to respond to protests with violence (Goodwin, Skocpol 1994:273). 
The most closed kind of authoritarian regime is the neo-patrimonial dictatorship. Besides the 
tendencies of the closed authoritarian regime, the neo-patrimonial dictatorship has a number of 
additional characteristics. They tend to be centered on specific persons. They are highly 
personalised regimes, and thus may not even enjoy the support of the whole top echelon of power. 
They may also be unable to fully penetrate national territory and the civil society (Goodwin, 
Skocpol 1994:265). 
In the economic sphere, these regimes tend to monopolise certain sectors of the economy 
and give the concomitant economic opportunities to their closest allies (family). Hence, it is a 
general characteristic of revolutions that they appear when the central state bureaucracy or regime 
has weak or absent social connections with the various classes in society (Goodwin, Skocpol 
1994:273). 
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4) The Formation and Erosion of Authoritarian Stability 
The following chapter establishes a historically embedded understanding of the position and logics 
of Syria’s ruling class in the 2000s and the events leading to the uprising. 
 
4.1) Syrian History - A History of Disenfranchisement 
Syria as it is known today was constituted by the French colonial mandate in 1920 (Hottinger 
1988:160). The French practiced a strategy of divide and rule and relied on rural minorities within 
the military to control the Sunni majority. After a brief division into several substates by the French, 
the urban Sunni establishment successfully managed to preserve the majority of territories initially 
part of the colonial mandate, except for Alexandretta (Hatay) and Lebanon (Hottinger 1988:162-
165). Fouad Ajami notes the irony of later disenfranchisement of Sunnis by minoritarian military 
officers whom they had denied their own states (2012:25). The dichotomy between Sunni capital 
owners and minoritarian rural military officers, and the distrust embedded within it, became a 
defining element of later Syrian politics (Ajami 2012:25; Hottinger 1988:164,165). 
Syria’s early post-independence period from 1946 to 1963 was marked by constant coups 
d’état and revolutions of democratic and military governments, in some years several times (Ajami 
2012; Azmeh 2014; Haddad 2012; Hottinger 1988). Typically these insurrections were carried out 
on behalf of specific political parties (Hottinger 1988:179). Each time a government was 
overthrown, the winning contender would attempt to gain complete control of the polity, 
concentrating power evermore (Ajami 2012:27). Syrian history may thus be read as a history of 
attempts at disenfranchising political opponents. A pattern of mistrust that has arguably continued 
up until the uprisings in 2011 (Haddad 2012:26,52,55,66,100). 
 
4.2) Stability - The Baʿthist Social Contract and Hafiz al Asad’s Military Cohesiveness 
The contestation of power by various party factions came to a standstill when the Arab Socialist 
Baʿth Party (ASBP) took power and dissolved Sunni government in 1963, making Baʿthism Syria’s 
politically dominant ideology. Baʿthism is the ideology of Arab rebirth or reinvigoration, formed 
during the late 1940s in the writings of, for instance, Michel Aflaq and Salah al Din al Bitar 
(Husseïn 1977:6; Farah 1978:20). The motto “Unity, Freedom, Socialism” mirrors the goals of Arab 
unity, freedom from external oppression and Arab socialist equality (Al-Sharoufi 2011:90-91; Farah 
1978:25). In Syria, the ASBP regime started a large reform program and introduced state provision 
of free basic services such as education, healthcare, food subsidies, energy subsidies, input 
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subsidies for the agricultural sector and the creation of job opportunities in the growing public 
sector and state enterprises (Seifan 2010:37). The policies and reforms created by the state would 
reduce poverty and produce growth   (Seifan 2010:32). At the same time the brutality and efficiency 
with which the ASBP eliminated political dissent became increasingly systematic (Ajami 2012:27-
29). The social contract of ASBP rule may thus be described as an authoritarian bargain (Desai, 
Olofsgård, Yousef 2011). In this authoritarian bargain, the ruling regime meets basic needs of the 
rural and urban labour classes, and in return receives the right to rule.  
The ASBP’s socialist politics, its minority cadre and the fact that urban Sunni capital had 
played a major role in breaking up the United Arab Republic (UAR) of 1958-1961 had created deep 
suspicions about their political role (Haddad 2012:25,52). On account of these suspicions between 
urban capital owners and the social base of the ASBP, the Baʿth regime started to thoroughly 
exclude the city elites from power and nationalise private capital. However, the Baʿthist officers 
that had won the party power in 1963 ousted the old leadership in 1966 and subsequently started an 
infighting that only ended with Hafiz al Asad’s ascension in 1970. Henceforth the ASBP is called 
the Baʿthist Arab Socialist Party (BASP). Hafiz al Asad was an Alawite officer of rural origin who 
had a strong position in the air force and secret services (Hottinger 1988:184). He soon consolidated 
power and put his personal followers, mainly consisting of Alawis, in head of the various bodies of 
the increasingly complex and harsh security apparatus, laying the foundation for the current 
architecture of Syrian politics (Ajami 2012:7-8). 
 
4.3) Political Distrust and Economy 
When Hafiz al Asad took office, Syria was still highly reliant upon the agricultural sector (Azmeh 
2014:6). The socialist nationalisation project that started under Nasir’s reign of the UAR continued 
to have popular support. Furthermore, the ASBP had always attempted to diminish the influence of 
the landowner class and “feudal” structures. Hafiz al Asad had legitimised his coup against Jadid as 
a corrective movement against extreme leftist policies and the humiliating failure against Israel in 
1967 (Hottinger:183-185). He thus maintained the BASP’s layout but attempted to reintegrate the 
capitalist Sunni class into the state’s political reserve (Haddad 2012:87). 
Especially within agriculture, subsidy policies had a positive impact and increased 
productivity. In the 1980s Syria became an exporter of wheat and other basic foodstuff (Seifan 
2010:6). However, the inclusion of capital proved difficult to approach (Haddad 2012:55-57). The 
distrust of the urban Sunni elites and large capital was, as described above, already deeply ingrained 
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into the BASP (Haddad 2012:25,52). Thus, the result was an informal private-public sector 
cooperation between the largely Alawi military elite and the urban Sunni bourgeoisie (Hinnebusch 
2011:110). This new alliance allowed the regime to reduce its direct ownership of capital without 
losing control of it. However, these new clientelist networks did not increase revenues; rather, they 
developed into a form of crony capitalism that siphoned off state resources and privatised public 
enterprises (Haddad 2012:124). Yet the Syrian state was able to sustain its social commitments 
using oil revenues and other rents (Azmeh 2014:6-10). According to Arnold Hottinger many of 
these rents were support provided by oil-rich Arab states with the intention to enable the 
maintenance of Syrian military capacities in face of the Israeli threat (Hottinger 1988:189). 
The economic situation became increasingly unsustainable when oil rents dropped and new 
legislation diminished foreign investments (Seifan 2010:4). Furthermore, the commitments of other 
Arab states fluctuated with the tension with Israel and oil prices (Hottinger 1988:189-190). 
Following the launch of perestroika in 1985, Syria plunged into a foreign currency crisis in 1986, 
resulting in a shortage of goods and further recession (Seifan 2010:45). The regime responded with 
a cautious reform program, but despite these rather minimal measures, the deficit increased and the 
situation worsened, leading to the lost decade for reform (Seifan 2010:6). The caution in reform 
may be explained by the regime’s increased need for support in face of Hafiz al Asad’s looming 
death and the earlier Muslim Brotherhood uprising in 1982 (Seifan 2010:3-6). 
The death of Hafiz al Asad and the inauguration of his son Bashar al Asad in 2000 seemed 
to offer an opportunity for invigoration of these economic reforms. However, Bashar’s place as 
successor was not uncontested, even though his father had removed many potential threats in the 
generality (Ajami 2012:5-6; Haddad 2012:100; Hinnebusch 2012:98). At this time the Syrian 
regime was based on three pillars: the BASP, the security apparatus and the bureaucracy 
(Hinnebusch 2011:110). In a bid to stabilise his power, Bashar al Asad began an unprecedented 
process of co-opting these institutions into his presidential power by appointing loyal members to 
these bodies (Hinnebusch 2011:111). Only 20% of those who held seats in these institutions in 1985 
continued to hold their seats into Bashar al Asad’s presidency (Hinnebusch 2011:113-117). Other 
governing organs and the security apparatus were co-opted in similar fashion (Haddad 2012; 
Hinnebusch 2011:110). 
During this process an unwritten and undeclared economic reform programme was launched 
(Seifan 2010:12). The government was aware of public fears of diminishing living standards and 
deprivation and realised the possible legitimacy costs (Seifan 2010:11,12). Thus a ‘low-key’ 
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approach was applied in an attempt to avoid resistance within Baʿth organisations, such as the 
Federations of Workers’ Unions, the Farmers’ Union, the professional and scientific federations and 
what Samir Seifan terms the “bureaucratic bourgeoisie” (Seifan 2010:10-12). It was not before 2005 
the so-called social market economy was officially introduced (Seifan 2010:12). In this process, the 
legacy of the “immortal leader”, Hafiz al Asadi was regularly invoked to legitimise the transition to 
Bashar al Asad (BASP 2015). However, even though reform was now officially on the agenda, a 
whole string of policy recommendations by government sponsored expert committees were ignored 
(Seifan 2010:7). This indicates that the resolution of economic issues was not the sole purpose of 
reform. Rather, the implemented reforms may be interpreted as a switch in government allegiances 
from labour to aligned capital (Hinnebusch 2012:95). Shamel Azmeh argues that Bashar al Asad 
applied a strategy of consolidating political power through redistributive economic reforms favoring 
large urban capital, arguing for the necessity of liberalising growth policies (Azmeh 2014:12). This 
kind of economic liberalisation and privatisation was embedded in the already existing power 
structure and thus did not benefit all of society may be described as ‘circumscribed liberalisation’ 
(Haddad 2012:123,124): Liberalisation that benefits the same informal public-private networks as 
those that benefitted from previous arrangements. It is a kind of transition from socialism to 
capitalism in selected areas controlled by beneficiaries (Haddad 2012:123,124). The allocation of 
rents to certain elite groups had already been a strategy of power maintenance under Hafiz al Asad 
(Haddad 2012:88,89; Hinnebusch 2012:97). An example of this is that during his reign and until the 
end of the Syrian occupation of Lebanon elites within the military had imported black market goods 
otherwise limited by tariffs and import restrictions and benefited from tailored import policies 
(Haddad 2012:91-94). 
 
4.4) Instability - Drought and Precarisation 
This section shows that the agricultural sector exemplifies the skewed developments caused by the 
post-2000 economic reforms and can be argued to be central to understanding the Syrian uprising. 
According to Seifan the implementation of the social market economy was proposed in several 
phases (2010:32). In order to create economic growth and financial resources capable of supporting 
social policies, public expenditures were reduced. In the agricultural sector this meant that both 
price and input subsidies were removed (Hinnebusch 2012:102). These subsidies had played a 
pivotal role in the expansive development of Syrian agriculture under Hafiz al Asad and had 
Page 15 of 42 
 
allowed Syria to become an exporter of wheat, essential to Syrian food security, in the late 1980s 
(Seifan 2010:6). 
The expenditure reductions made a break with the former Baʿth party’s social base and came 
at significant legitimacy costs. Primarily the poorest segments of society were affected. There was 
less social employment in the public and state-owned sectors and the regime would limit free 
healthcare and education (Azmeh 2014:12). The ruling elite, on the other hand, found itself in a 
better economic position (Azmeh 2014:12). Simultaneously the new investment law of 2007 
reduced the tax ceiling from 36% to 27% (Seifan 2010:13). These new reforms had a negative 
impact on smaller businesses and farmers, whose competitiveness on the market were no longer 
taken into consideration. The re-emerging political influence of large capital found its way into the 
public eye through the presentation of class wealth encouraged by the liberal climate (Azmeh 
2014:13). Thus inequality and the increasing wealth gap in the Syrian society became more visible, 
widening the divide between large capital and the power nexus on the one hand and labour and the 
shrinking middle class on the other hand. Consequently, the regime grew unpopular among its 
former supporters (Azmeh 2014:13-14).  
This situation was worsened by the drought and the government’s failure in providing 
necessary aid (Azmeh 2014:15-16). During the drought of the 2006 to 2010 period, almost 75% of 
farmers in northeastern Syria lost crops and herders in the al Hasakah province lost 85% of their 
livestock (Femia, Werrell 2012). A report by the UN assesses the number of displaced farmers to 
have been 800,000, and around one million people were estimated to be food insecure, an 
unprecedented expansion of the Syrian precariat (Babah, Erian, Katlan 2010:15). Before this 
ecological disaster, Syria was an exporter of wheat with an average production of 4.7 million tons, 
but in  2007/2008 that number had declined to 2.1 million tons- not even half of Syria’s long-term 
average output. In a matter of years Syria went from being an exporter to an importer (de Châtel 
2014:524). 
Having lost their livelihood, rural farmers migrated to the cities. By late 2010 hundreds of 
thousands of Syrians had migrated to the country’s larger cities where they lived without proper 
access to sanitation, electricity, water or food in tent camps. Before the mass-migration that had 
created these camps, most of the larger cities had already had an influx of refugees from Palestine 
and Iraq and concomitant high rates of unemployment. With no real social security network, the 
amount of people living on or below the UN-defined poverty line of two US dollars a day had 
doubled to almost 10% in urban areas and over 20% in rural (de Châtel 2014:525). 
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Between 2009 and 2010, the rain partly returned to some areas of Syria, yet the drought had 
left its mark on especially on the poorest regions of Syria, particularly in the north east of the 
country in the form of malnutrition and diseases (Femia, Werrel  2012). For example, 42% of 6-12 
year old’s in the Raqqa province were suffering from anaemia (de Châtel 2014:525). 
 
4.5) Sub-conclusion 
The following paragraphs give an overview of the chapter and synthesise the point of departure for 
the following parts of the analysis of the Syrian uprising. 
    After Hafiz al Asad’s ascension to the Syrian presidency in 1970, a group of military officers 
became the new nucleus of power and displaced the urban elites. Effectively this disenfranchised 
the urban middle class and large private capital. The strong support for left-leaning policies 
expanded state capital and social services. Even though not openly hostile to private capital the 
BASP limited its freedom to prevent power contestation. However, the decline of state revenues and 
the possibility of elite dissent to the succession of Hafiz al Asad by Bashar al Asad forced a 
renegotiation of the relation of state and private capital. This reduced the state’s capacity to uphold 
the traditional Baʿthist social contract and marginalised the disenfranchised classes even further. 
The reforms initiated after 1984 led to privatisation and cuts in social services. However, the 
government was able to retain control of capital through unofficial connections and subsequently 
used these connections to relocate its social base from labour to capital. After Bashar al Asad’s 
ascension in 2000, these trends were exacerbated by increased reform efforts. The reforms were ill-
timed and came around the same time as a devastating drought kicked in. These events increased 
the scale of human suffering, and the regime no longer provided basic goods for the Syrian 
population. This eroded the authoritarian bargain which had underpinned political stability in Syria 
until the beginning of these events.  
    Furthermore, the high levels of political exclusion, suppression of expansive economic growth 
and the extensive use of violence in politics that are part of the historical process described above, 
must be understood as rational within the environment for power brokering. The Syrian institutions 
may thus be attested an essential lack of trust, a barrier for open, inclusive politics. 
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5) The Syrian Mode of Authoritarianism - Neo-patrimonial Networks and 
Mobilisation Through Exclusion 
The previous chapter outlines the economic and political transformations Syria has undergone and 
characterises the reforms in years preceding the uprising. From this point of departure the following 
chapter analytically establishes causal relations between the observed changes and the creation of 
some of the permissive conditions for revolutionary mobilisation. Goodwin and Skocpol’s 
characterisation of distinct modes of authoritarianism and their specific propensities in dealing with 
and causing dissent and uprisings serves as principal theoretical guidance of this analysis. 
Identifying Bashar al Asad’s regime as inclusive or exclusive authoritarianism may thus be helpful 
in understanding policy choices and the impact of these. Furthermore, the role of individuals within 
the Syrian power nexus is analysed in a network analysis. The chapter ends by assessing how some 
of these processes translated into the wider society.  
 
5.1) Syria - Identifying the Regime Type 
While the reform packages initiated after 2005 superficially increased Syria’s performance on a 
number of economic indicators such as growth in FDI and GDP (Hinnebusch 2012:100; Seifan 
2010:22). Contemporaneously, the living standards of the majority of the population fell effectively 
and poverty and precarisation became increasingly prevalent (Seifan 2010; Azmeh, 2014).  
On the surface, the reforms initiated by Bashar al Asad might have appeared as an attempt at 
taking Syria’s authoritarian regime in a more “inclusionary” direction, through its project to 
“modernize [its] authoritarianism” (Hinnebusch 2012:95). It appeared to some that Syria was 
transitioning from a closed authoritarian system towards a more autocratic and, some would argue, 
more meritocratic system of governance based on so-called market socialism. Syria significantly 
improved its approval ratings and its leadership was even regarded, by some, as a “...potential 
source of stability” (The Economist 2007). 
However, as clarified in the last chapter, by co-opting political and military power into the 
hands of the presidency the accessibility of the political pathway for the resolution of grievances in 
Syria was greatly reduced. Syria was therefore in fact not moving towards a more inclusive model 
of authoritarianism in neither the economic nor the political sense of the word. 
Rather, Syria was moving in a direction where it conformed with a number of defining 
criteria for what Skocpol (1994) terms as a neo-patrimonial autocracy. It maintained its rule but, as 
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was visible on the scale of human suffering, did not deliver the same amount and quality of public 
goods.  
Its civil administration was relatively weak, ill-coordinated and endemically corrupt (de 
Châtel 2014:530). There were very little political openings for  opposition-groups, and a harsh 
clampdowns on critics of the regime. Several journalists, for instance, were arrested while others 
were subject to extralegal intimidations (Freedom House 2010). As described in the previous 
chapter this policy logic indicates a continuation of historical policy patterns and pressures. 
To further establish, and elaborate on the regime’s neo-patrimonial character the following 
network analysis traces the degree of personalisation of the Syrian power nexus observable under 
Bashar al Asad. 
 
5.2) Regime Networks 
The following paragraphs presents key actors of Bashar al Asad’s network and their roles in the 
Syrian power nexus and thereby reflect the summary findings of the project’s social network 
analysis (Figure 1) of Syrian elite networks in a concrete fashion, using the network around Bashar 
al Asad. 
 
    It is a recurring theme in the literature around the root causes for the civil war, that Asad’s 
governance networks were gradually becoming more personalised. Vacant spots in the bureaucracy 
and security apparatus were filled with Asad’s own family and other closely aligned elites (Azmeh 
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2014; Haddad 2012; Hinnebusch 2011:110-117; Hinnebusch 2012:99). The network analysis 
conducted in this project does indeed support this narrative. 
The highest in-degree measure is that of Bashar al Asad, his brother Maher and their cousin, 
and general Dhu Al Himma Shalish. Their level of connection is followed by general and 
businessman Hafiz Makhluf and General Mohammed Nasif Kheirbek, whose importance in the 
regime structure is defined by his relations with Qasem Soleimani, the leader of the Iranian Al Quds 
forces. Within the identified core circle Nasif Kheirbek is the only person not related to the Asad 
clan,to have high betweenness and in-degree measures. This degree of fraternisation of the regime, 
to some extent, makes these policy networks more or less similar to so-called ego-networks, 
centered on one of the Asads. 
However, a large group of businesspeople and intellectuals are completely disconnected 
from this network, and make up an entirely separate network, all of whom are co-authors of the 
Damascus Declaration, a 2005 statement that is critical towards the government and calls for 
democratic reform. Led by then-imprisoned industrialist and former MP, Riad Seif, this group had 
no access or connections with the regime’s inner circle. Other nodes are completely isolated, such 
as Moaz Al-Khatib, an Islamic Scholar and critic of the regime, who later would be one of the 
opposition leaders. 
A second finding from the network analysis, is that the Syrian regime’s inner networks cut 
across the spheres of the security apparatus, business sector as well as, to some extent, politics. One 
reason for this, Haddad argues, is that an economic network is relying on the security apparatus as 
the guarantor of rent and the bureaucracy as the provider of contracts (2012:97). Yet, many cabinet 
members of government are not well-connected to the security apparatus. The prime- and finance 
ministers of Syria are only connected to Asad and not to the rest of the network, and thus do not 
enjoy similar  influence. This was demonstrated at the wake of the uprisings when large parts of the 
cabinet of Syria’s government collectively resigned, some in protest over the actions of the regime 
(Council on Foreign Relations 2012). 
These findings are similar to ones made by others, indicating that power in the market and in 
the military is highly intertwined (Haddad 2012). Market actors, it appears, are not necessarily 
connected to formal institutions that have formalised power. Rather, informal connections to people 
in power are sufficient as military, political and economic power is captured within the central 
governance network and is intimately connected. In practice, that makes it difficult to untangle and 
thus to analyse power within these realms separately (Haddad 2012). 
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Since political, military and economic power are so deeply intertwined and centralised 
policies tailored to allocate rents to these very network can easily be created and implemented 
(Haddad 2012). It is not possible to track the development and negotiation and formulation of 
policy, but it is likely to occur within this network, where both economic, political and military 
power is located.  
One way of assessing whether the 2005 social market reforms were largely tailored 
according to fit the interests of this narrow group, the so-called new economic elite, is to look at the 
beneficiaries of the reform, as well as those who lost from it  (Haddad 2012:91). 
The most relevant example of this is the Makhluf family. The Makhluf family is related to 
the Asad family by marriage to Hafiz al Asad. Rami Makhluf, Bashar al Asad’s cousin, is likely 
Syria’s most powerful business tycoon (Shadid 2011). He owns the majority of controlling shares of 
Cham Holdings, a company involved in and dominating sectors such as real estate, construction and 
development, commercial, non-islamic financial services, infrastructure and utilities in Syria (see 
appendix). According to economists such as Azmeh and Seifan, many of the sectors in which Cham 
Holdings were active benefitted the most from the so-called liberalisation (2014:13; 2010:15,19). 
Example includes the real estate laws that restrained rents in the housing market. When such laws 
were liberalised  it opened a series of new investment opportunities in both the real estate, 
construction and materials industries. This resulted in rapidly rising land and estate prices, but had 
large social consequences as rents went out of control and people were evicted in large numbers 
(Seifan 2010:20,23-24). 
Rami Makhluf’s brother, Ihab Makhluf, owns Syria’s largest phone provider Syriatel. While 
their brother Hafiz Makhluf is a high-ranking officer of the General Security Directorate, one of 
Syria’s most important civilian intelligence agencies. At the time it was led by Assef Shawkat, 
Bashar al Asad’s brother in law. As such the Makhlufs may well be called Syria’s second family. 
They are rumored to be controlling up to 60% of Syria’s economy (Williams 2011)1 and are thus 
also one of the most hated ones. New York Times reporter Anthony Shadid, recounts how 
protesters in Dar’a attacked assets of the Makhluf family, chanted about the family and burned off 
pictures of Rami Makhluf. Shadid describes Rami Makhluf as the “... symbol of how economic 
reforms turned crony socialism into crony capitalism, making the poor poorer and the connected 
rich fantastically wealthier.” (2011). 
                                                          
1
 A number that could be an exaggeration, but nevertheless shows how the status of this family is perceived. 
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Another of Syria’s great families is the Shalish-family, who own the company SES 
International. SES International is a weapon manufacturer and military construction company, 
rumored to make shady deals around the world - including to Iraqi Baʿth-supporters after 2003 (US 
Treasury 2005). The Shalish family is also said to control the so-called Shabiha, a pro-government 
militia that does much of the regime’s dirty work (i.e. rape and plunder). Dhu al Himma Shalish, 
Bashar al Asad’s paternal cousin, is also the head of  the country’s Presidential Security.  
A third example of a family closely tied to the Asad’s was the Tlas family. For instance, The 
“sugar king of Syria” (Gelvin 2012:108), Firas Tlas, was one of the main beneficiaries of the 
reforms. As is the case with the Shalish and the Makhluf families, the Tlas business moguls were 
connected to the security apparatus. Manaf Tlas, was a general in the Syrian army, before defecting 
in favour of the Free Syrian Army in 2012. His father and former defense minister, Mustafa Tlas, 
was instrumental in allowing Bashar al Asad to inherit his father’s position (Hinnebusch 2011:113), 
and many of the Tlas members on the Regional Command were of those brought there after Asad’s 
co-optation of Syria’s governance structure described above. The Tlas family, however, is the only 
dynasty in this analysis co-opted into the central Syrian governance network without being related 
to Asad through marriage. 
On the other hand, several previously-great business leaders and entrepreneurs were 
excluded from the gains of these so-called liberalisation policies. Among these excluded elites were 
the Sanqar family, one of the families among the traditional Sunni bourgeoisie. This family owned 
businesses in the tourism and agricultural sectors (Haddad 2012:171,172) but lost much of their 
business when many of their enterprises were taken over by allies closer to Asad (Briscoe, Janssen, 
Smits 2012:47). Alongside other entrepreneurial business-leaders like Riad Seif, the owner of the 
Syrian branch of Adidas, and Ammar Qurabi, who owned the rights to a UAE-based satellite TV-
station, the Sanqar brothers voiced their dissatisfaction with the so-called social market reforms. 
Many of these personalities of the business elite were not only alienated from the regime, but lived 
in fear of regime crackdowns (Briscoe, Janssen, Smits 2012:17). 
Such circumscribed liberalisation was largely possible because it lacked strategy and 
because it was not implemented by a merit bureaucracy and a judiciary that could settle disputes 
(Seifan 2010:65). Rather, it was shrouded in secrecy and miscommunication demonstrated very 
well in liberalisation-policies not even being announced publicly before the 10
th
 Baʿth conference in 
2005. 
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Consequently those businesses that became large and profitable were often those closely 
aligned with the regime, while other private businesses were bereft of opportunity (Haddad 
2012:80-84; Hinnebusch 2012:102). Syria’s institutions were not inclusive, favouring competition, 
but rather in Acemoglu and Robinson’s terminology extractive (Acemoglu, Robinson 2012). By 
selectively establishing networks and elite patronage-relationships, Syria’s central power holders 
favoured the wealth generation of the new economic elite excluding an increasing part of the private 
sector as well as a rural and urban working class that no longer had lost much of its access to 
political and social goods (Haddad 2012). 
It can thus be argued that the Syrian national economy gradually declined into a zero-sum 
game with the winners from these arrangements being the new economic elite and the losers being 
the old bourgeoisie and the rural and urban working class, whose interests Hafiz al Asad had 
maintained. The regime and its business appendix had thus thoroughly isolated itself from all other 
classes and reflected a narrower coalition than ever. 
 
5.3) Growing Space for Mobilisation 
According to Goodwin and Skocpol, the narrower a coalition a regime represents, the larger amount 
of space there is for mobilisation of excluded groups (1994:273). In the preceding chapter and 
paragraphs, it is demonstrated that certain socioeconomic and political groups were alienated from 
access to goods that established the authoritarian bargain and legitimacy of Baʿthist rule. Syria can 
thus be understood as highly exclusionary, neo-patrimonial autocracy. However, as many conflict 
scholars state, such grievances do not guarantee mobilisation and Goodwin and Skocpol point out 
that misery does not breed revolt on its own (Romano 2006:12; 1994:260). The following 
paragraphs briefly analyses how political and economical changes translated into such 
opportunities.  
One way to note the development of such structures is to look at the response of the Syrian 
civil society, and at the discourses about social issues taking place alongside with a shift of policies 
(de Elvira, Zintl 2014). The government encouraged public-private partnerships to fill the gap in 
social security that the retreat of the state had caused. Certain regime aligned NGOs, often led by 
Bashar al Asad’s wife, Asma al Asad, took on social and humanitarian responsibilities, but in 
practice these NGOs were not aimed at filling much of the vacuum created by the retreating state 
(de Elvira, Zintl 2014:344). Laura Ruiz de Elvira and Tina Zintl argue that this should be 
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understood as an attempt of the Asads to capitalise on  poverty. It was a simple “... outsourcing and 
selling-off of the state’s responsibility to the poor.” (de Elvira, Zintl 2014:345). 
This attempt to capitalise on poverty failed miserably, and instead of “winning hearts and 
minds” (de Elvira, Zintl 2014:344), it provided a basis for both popular and elite opposition to the 
regime, space for popular discontent as well as space for a certain degree of organisational know-
how for the people (de Elvira, Zintl 2014:338). An interesting case is the highly successful Sufi-
Islamic Zayd movement, which provided help to the distressed in many of Syrian’s large urban 
areas (Pierret, Selvik 2009). The Zayd movement was an governmentally approved charity.(Pierret, 
Selvik 2009:597). Despite government approval many charities had ambiguous and lukewarm 
attitudes towards the regime (Pierret, Selvik 2009:607). By their mere existence, however, these 
movements created an alternative, albeit limited, provider of welfares and visibly demonstrated the 
limits for the regime’s attempts at authoritarian upgrading (Pierret, Selvik 2009:610). 
As civil society had more space for mobilising, the Syrian civil society also had established 
social networks. No more was this the case than in the city of Dar’a as well as other so-called early 
risers such as Idlib and Deir Ez-Zor (Leenders, Heydemann 2012). What defines these places is the 
weak penetration of their space by the regime, and the space for creation of other ways of social 
organisation that gives. This is visible on a number of areas: First and foremost a social structure of 
clans and families, the predominant form of Islam in such areas being a type of Sufism that 
emphasised social justice, provided a sense of solidarity and had, to a limited degree, mitigating 
effects on the impacts on the drought and levels of poverty (Leenders, Heydemann 2012:144). 
Moreover, in these areas, there were large crime-networks which were not under regime control.  
    Together, these factors created strong interconnected networks, that could easily join together 
around a common cause. These networks were effective in giving concrete mobilisation-skills to a 
large number of individuals. Such a horizontal organisation gave these networks the a sense of 
“resilience in the face of a regime determined to identify ‘conspirators’ to eliminate” (Leenders, 
Heydemann, 2012:155). By creating exchange fora for information, these networks were also 
effective in the creation of a new anti-regime discourse (Leenders, Heydemann, 2012:155), it is 
therefore not a complete coincidence that the Syrian uprising was triggered in Dar’a (Leenders, 
Heydemann, 2012:155). 
When the Arab spring started, the Asad government seemed to acknowledge the 
consequences of breaking the social contract. Belatedly it attempted to restart public spending, 
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raised minimum wages and fired certain of the ministers that were perceived as the faces of 
liberalisation (de Elvira, Zintil 2014:345). 
 
5.4) Sub-conclusion 
This chapter has argued that prior to the uprisings, Syria was a personalised neo-patrimonial 
dictatorship with highly exclusionary political and economic tendencies. The only truly stable elite 
alignments were the few families that were part of the inner circle of the regime’s governance 
network. The policy-interests of this narrow group prevented sustainable and inclusive industrial 
policy and corroded the authoritarian bargain that constituted the social contract. The abandonment 
of the social contract particularly affected the rural and urban working class. 
As is predicted by Goodwin and Skocpol’s theory, Syria’s ruling regime gathered a large 
coalition against it due to its exclusionary tendencies, weak bureaucracy and deficient rule of law. 
In a country with such a regime civil war is theoretically more likely, although a large anti-
government coalition does not necessarily equal that the regime is easily to topple. In Syria, the 
inner governance network exercises rather strict control of the country’s wealth as well as the 
security apparatus. 
As the regime retreated from its previous social obligation the degree of its penetration of 
the civil society was similarly diminishing, allowing for mobilisation of those marginalised by 
regime policies.  
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6) Untangling the Permissive Conditions of the Syrian Uprising 
This chapter discusses the causal position and explanatory power of the various arguments made on 
the origins of the Syrian uprising and argues for the importance of underlying political causes. As 
mentioned, the aim of this project is to attempt to disentangle various permissive conditions for the 
uprising. The literature review sets out the point of departure for explanatory variety, while some 
models have been added in the later process. 
It has been argued that it was the exclusionary tendencies of Syria as a personalised neo-
patrimonial dictatorship that created space for mobilisation. When the regime no longer could or 
would live up to its previous obligations towards the rest of Syrian society, it abandoned the 
authoritarian bargain and created the space for mobilisation of the marginalised to protest against 
this change and the worsening of their situation. The Syrian uprising, however, is a complex 
phenomenon, and as such the role of a large set of additional potential root causes and triggers 
require attention. 
 
6.1) The Inequality Narrative 
Some of the possible and common politico-economic explanations of the Syrian conflict lies in the 
inequality-conflict nexus hypothesis, stating that inequality can lead to conflict (Bartusevičius 
2013:46). In both mass media and academia this view on the Syrian uprising is held (al-Aita 2014; 
Østby 2013). As noted by Østby, however, research on inequality as the independent variable has 
not come up with any direct causal links. In fact, it has only been possible to establish a statistical 
correlation between inequality and conflict when it comes to greed and horizontal inequality 
(2013:213). Even with this correlation, vertical and horizontal inequalities only exercise partly 
explanatory power, and any directly causal relationship cannot be established. This is indeed also 
the case for the Syrian conflict. Nevertheless, lacking explanatory power and a clear theoretical 
foundation it is important to consider whether these concepts may be important bricks in the puzzle 
to untangle root causes for a conflict. For this reason, it is essential to ask when and in which 
context inequality, both vertically and horizontally, might contribute to an uprising and a civil war. 
Rising inequality is particularly eroding to stability when segments of society are left in poverty 
(Stewart 2000:245)  
Inequality is therefore best viewed as an outcome of political and economic changes caused 
in the political process. In the Syrian case it was the change in how the regime distributed political 
power and social goods that made the inequality gap too wide, leaving large proportions of the 
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country in absolute poverty. At the same time inequality became more visible through a new group 
of ‘regime business class’ that liked to show off their wealth (Azmeh 2014:13; Seifan 2010:23). 
Hence, vertical inequalities were not merely natural phenomena of Syria but were produced 
and reproduced in power relations within the country. In Syria, vertical inequality is thus best 
conceptualised as a permissive condition. Its role was not causal, but it did contribute to the erosion 
of the regime’s legitimacy.  
 
6.2) The Horizontal Inequality Narrative 
Like vertical inequality significant horizontal inequalities were present in pre-war Syria, and the 
percentages of the population living in poverty varied across geographical locations. The Deir Ez-
Zor and Raqqa provinces were predominantly Sunni with Christian minorities and had significantly 
higher poverty rates than Latakia and Tartous, which are areas predominantly Alawi (OPHDI 
2015). Furthermore, Alexander De Juan and Andre Bank suggest the regime selectively provided 
public goods to certain areas in return for political support (De Juan, Banks 2014:91). One could 
make the argument that these inequalities are largely a product of what this project has termed the 
Syrian history of disenfranchisement, being rooted in a deep mistrust between various groups and 
classes. While horizontal inequalities were deep and persistent, they may not have caused the 
uprisings per se either. Christopher Phillips warns of both over-emphasising and downplaying the 
role of sectarian identities (2015). In Syria, national identities has long existed alongside sectarian 
ones. The national identity, Phillips claims, with a few exceptions, tended to be predominant prior 
to the conflict. Furthermore, when the uprisings began, it was under nationalist slogans, not 
sectarian ones (Phillips 2015:359). The increased sectarianisation of the Syrian civil war is a result 
of state failure leaving an identity vacuum for sectarian entrepreneurs. These include external actors 
who have strong interests in increasing the salience of and polarisation between ethnic groups in 
Syria, in what is largely a regional struggle for hegemony (Phillips 2015:266). Because the concept 
of Sectarianism “varies over space and time” (Phillips 2015:358), analysing the development of 
these ethnic and sectarian cleavages  lies outside of the scope of this paper. 
Furthermore, sectarian relations in Syria, as is argued in the historical part of this project, 
were complicated and marked by distrust, yet not completely hostile. At least, both Hafiz al Asad 
and his Bashar al Asad attempted to reintegrate the Sunni capitalist classes.  
Horizontal inequality may be a useful concept, and may even have acted as another 
permissive condition. However, it is difficult to argue that group relative deprivations and ‘ancient 
Page 27 of 42 
 
rivalries’ were the primary underlying causes for the uprising. Such an argument is dependent on a 
‘primordialist’ narration of historical developments emphasising sectarian belonging of actors and 
attributing it central importance (Phillips 2015:371). Instead, economic horizontal inequality was 
largely caused by selective goods provisions (De Juan, Banks 2014). Although the differences 
between Alawi Latakia and Sunni Dar’a could be interpreted as sectarian discrimination, they are 
still better understood as outcomes of a political logic concerned with maintaining certain patron-
client networks (De Juan, Banks 2014:94) 
 
6.3) The Ecological Catastrophe Narrative 
The drought of 2006 to 2010 has variously been interpreted as trigger and permissive condition of 
the Syrian uprising and a popular explanation for the Syrian civil war in mass media, politics and 
among NGOs. The English Prince Charles, for instance, has stated that he believes climate change 
to be one of the “major reasons for this horror in Syria” (Holden 2015), and the climate activist, 
Nafeez Ahmed, argues that the Syrian civil war heralds the “age of climate warfare” (Ahmed 
2014). 
This argument, in which climate change and the many environmental issues they create are 
seen as independent variables, is tempting, but can also be misleading, as research only shows 
limited support for the notion that ecological disaster is an important contributor for conflict 
(Gleditsch 2012). Solely blaming external events such as climate change can be viewed as 
distraction from the root-causes of social friction (de Châtel 2014:523). Francesca de Châtel argues 
that the narrative of climate warfare: “..strengthens the narrative of the Assad regime that seizes 
every opportunity to blame external factors for its own failings and inability to reform” (de Châtel 
2014:532). 
There are indeed policy-failures behind such serious social consequences as the ones 
witnessed in Syria from 2006 to 2010. For instance, the Asad regime ran highly ecologically 
unsustainable well-digging policies which drained groundwater reserves (de Châtel 2014). By 
labelling such environmental issues as “sensitive issues”, the regime was allowed to let endemic 
corruption around water politics go on (de Châtel 2014). Furthermore, when the drought kicked in, 
the regime held media under tight control and released numbers that were gross underestimates (de 
Châtel 2014:528). Finally, those who migrated from the drought received little mitigation of their 
suffering from the government. The regime was even accused of people no help at all (Saleeby 
2012). 
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The drought is therefore best conceptualised as a “threat multiplier” (CNA Corporation 
2007:3), as it played into existing political, social and economic problems and severely impacted 
stability. It was a shock that worsened the social situation in an area where the living standards were 
already marginal. However, it was not a surprise. Droughts are  not rare in Syria (de Châtel 
2014:522). What made this one different was the government’s response to it, and the interrelated 
sets of issues it worsened. Like vertical and horizontal inequality, it was not the drought in itself 
that laid the foundation for popular uprising the Syrian. Rather institutional mismanagement and 
little attempt at mitigation caused the drought to have such devastating consequences (de Châtel 
2014). 
In this context the social contract is relevant. Murshed argues that with rules accepted by 
society, uprisings and large scale violence is unlikely to start out (2002:390). As the project also 
argues, a weak social contract significantly increases the risk of conflict and civil war (Murshed 
2002:390; Romano 2006:25). 
 
6.4) Sub-conclusion 
The roles played by factors such as ‘greed’, ‘grievance’, vertical inequality, horizontal inequalities 
etc. depend largely on how they are managed or mismanaged institutionally, and in what context 
they exist. Inequalities and motivations for mobilisation can both be mitigated and reproduced in 
the political process, but they are unlikely to successfully be so in a neo-patrimonial dictatorship 
such as the one in Syria. The primary permissive condition for the Syrian conflict is therefore the 
erosion of the social contract, which was to a large extent caused by the exclusionary regime 
politics. 
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7) Conclusion 
The relative political stability of Syria during the reign of Hafiz al Asad from 1970 to 2000 rested 
on the Baʿthist social contract, the so-called authoritarian bargain, securing popular legitimacy, 
intensified suppression and elite appeasement. However, the Syrian economy suffered from these 
tendencies and reform thus started in the mid-1980s. Bashar al Asad intensified these reforms and 
co-opted political, military and economic power into ever-narrower networks. These networks 
integrated their interests into reform efforts, producing tailored reforms. This meant that 
liberalisation was circumscribed by elite interests. Contemporaneously, the retreat of the state from 
the role as provider of social and economic goods created a large precariat, especially amongst rural 
labour that had depended on subsidies and was now drawn to the cities. These events are argued to 
indicate that the Syrian regime is what Goodwin and Skocpol label a neo-patrimonial authoritarian 
dictatorship. Such a regime tends to leave space for political entrepreneurs to mobilise against it. It 
is argued that the most important permissive condition for the conflict was the erosion of the social 
contract when the Baʿthist promise was abandoned. This is shown to be linked to increasingly 
exclusionary politics. Hence the hypothesis is verified. However, the role of the Bashar al Asad 
regime cannot securely be determined as actions need to be understood in the context of historical 
trajectories and institutional structures. 
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8) Implications  
Even though it has been argued that regime intentions cannot be determined, responsibility can still 
be allocated even when the importance of structural factors is recognised. The precarisation of large 
segments of the Syrian population can thus be understood as a deliberately accepted side effect of 
self-enriching network politics. In this perspective the call for the creation of a legitimate order in 
Syria must be heeded, if order is to be restored.  Meanwhile, the Bashar al Asad government has 
demonstrated its willingness to commit human rights abuses and war crimes to stay in power 
(Amnesty International 2015:354). It has made extensive use of mass torture, barrel-bombing, 
chemical warfare and is accused of arbitrary arrests (Amnesty International 2015:353-358). This 
means that Bashar al Asad has not only rendered his claims to the Syrian presidency illegitimate, 
but can also reasonably be accused of war crimes. Regardless of the circumstances, and even if it is 
in the name of fighting the so-called Islamic State, he cannot retain his position. Furthermore, the 
evolving frontiers of Kurdish nationalism and the corrosion of the Iraqi-Syrian border may require a 
more general rethinking of states in West Asia.  
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10) Appendix 
10.1) Who’s Who in Syria? 
 
Regime network: 
 
al Asad/Shawkat, Bushra: Bashar’s sister, Assef’s Husband. Owns pharmaceutical companies in 
Syria, and owns many licenses given by the government (Stratfor 2008; The Council of the 
European Union 2012a) 
 
al Asad, Maher: Bashar’s brother and one of the absolute most powerful men in Syria. He is a 
general in charge of the elite forces known as the republican guard and some of the armored 
divisions. Besides his military endeavors he is a powerful business moghul, running several 
businesses with Rami Makhlouf, now relocated to Dubai. 
(The Council of the European Union 2011a) 
 
al Dardari, Abdullah: Syria’s deputy prime minister, pro-market economic reformer. Removed in 
2011 due to disagreements with Rami Makhlouf. 
(Der Spiegel 2011) 
 
al Imadai, Muhammad: Chairman of the Board of Commissioners of the Syrian Commission on 
Financial Markets and Securities. Former minister of economy and trade. (Haddad 2012) 
 
al Quwatly,Ra’if: Business associate of Maher al-Assad and responsible for managing some of his 
business interests. (The Council of the European Union 2012a)  
 
al Tabba, Mazen: Owner of Currency exchange in Damascus alongside Rami, and close business-
partner of Ihab and Nizar. 
(The Council of the European Union 2012a) 
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Altoun, Salim: CEO of Altoun group, oil exporter that provides revenue directly to the regime. 
(Wall Street Journal 2011) 
 
Kheirbek, Mohammed Nasif: Influential Military adviser, Alawite and married into the Asad 
family. Has very strong ties to the Iranians, and in particular, with the leader of the IRGC/Al-Quds 
Force Gen Soleimani. 
(The Council of the European Union 2012b) 
 
Makhlouf, Hafez: Brother of Rami Makhlouf and head of the Intelligence Service, General 
Security Directorate, which is the highest civilian intelligence service in Syria. (The Council of the 
European Union 2011a) 
 
Makhlouf, Ihab: CEO of Syriatel, transferring profits to the Syrian regime.  
(The Council of the European Union 2012a) 
 
Makhlouf, Rami: Possibly Syria’s richest and most influential businessman and owner of Cham 
Holdings. Rumor has it that FDI is impossible without his consent, and that courts and much of the 
political process was in his pockets. Mr. Makhlouf is one of the absolute central figures in pre-war 
Syria, and deserves attention as the top of Asad’s business network 
(The Council of the European Union 2011a) 
 
Mamluk, Ali : Head of NSB, the National Security Bureau. The NSB is the central coordinating 
intelligence service of Syria with a high degree of independence. As the NSB has been in charge of 
the rough clampdowns on protesters. He is sanctioned by both the EU and the US. Sunni. Inner 
circle of Asad. Bassam Al-Hassan: Syrian officer and businessman in weapons. Close to Bashar al 
Asad. (Haddad 2012; The Council of the European Union 2011a) 
 
Sabbagh, Bassam: Legal and financial adviser and manages affairs of Rami Makhlouf and 
Khaldoun Makhlouf. Involved with Bashar al-Assad in funding a real estate project in Latakia. 
Provides financial support for the regime. (The Council of the European Union 2012a) 
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Shahada, Rafiq: Probably head of the military intelligence of Syria, which is an organ above the 
NSB. He is therefore directly responsible for many of the brutalities of the Syrian regime. 
According to EU sources he is also one of Asad’s closest advisors. Alawi.  
(The Council of the European Union 2011c) 
 
Shalish, Asif Issa: Dhu al Himma Shalish’ nephew.  
(UK sanctions directive 2015) 
 
Shalish, Dhu al Himma: Asad’s cousin (through marriage), head of presidential security forces, 
CEO of weapon manufacturing companies that delivered to Iraq both before and after the US 
invasion. Rumored to be the organizer of the so-called “Shabiha” (ghosts in Levantine Arabic), 
gangs of incredibly brutal regime supporters terrorizing civilians. Ties to Saddam Hussein’s family. 
(Wikileaks 2006; Haddad 2012) 
 
Shalish, Riyad Issa: Dhu al Himma Shalish’ brother, cousin of Asad. Has become rich through 
construction and development. 
(The Council of the European Union 2012a) 
 
Shawkat, Assef: Former deputy minister of defence. Married to Bushra Al Asad. Killed. (The 
Council of the European Union 2011a) 
 
Soleimani, Qasem: First non-syrian on this list so far. He is the General of Al-quds force (The 
Council of the European Union 2011b) 
 
Tlas, Firas: The “sugar king of Syria”, who benefited from reforms. Defected in 2011, and 
supports the FSA. Most of family still support the FSA (Gelvin 2012) 
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Tlas, Manaf : General in the Syrian Army during time-period of analysis. Defected and joined the 
FSA in 2012. 
(Al Akhbar 2012) 
 
Zaitun, Muhammad Dib: At the time, head of the Political Security Directorate and before that he 
was head of the General Security Directorate. In short, he was head of civilian police and 
surveillance. Also charged with various crimes and massacres by the EU. (The Council of the 
European Union 2011a) 
 
Selected members of the Syrian opposition: 
 
al Hurani, Dr Fida Akram: Ba’th intellectual who was exiled with the coup against Jadid. Co-
author of Damascus Declaration. (Damascus Declaration 2005) 
 
al Khatib, Moaz: Very influential Damascene Imam and theologian considered a moderate 
Islamist.. By 2012 (which is after our analysis), he became president of Syria’s coalition of 
coalitions alongside secular figures. Exiled in Egypt. Now co-president of National Coalition for 
Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (BBC News 2013) 
 
Atassi, Suheir: Feminist human rights activist. Co-author of the Damascus Declaration. 
 
Id, Dr Abd-al-Razza: Imprisoned philosopher, activist and criticizer of Bashar during the 
Damascus spring. Co-drafter of various government-critical statements, including Damascus 
declaration.(Damascus Declaration 2005) 
 
Kilo, Michel: Syriac-Christian Human Rights Activist. Co-author of Damascus Declaration. 
(Damascus Declaration 2005) 
Said, Jawdat: Islamic scholar, human rights activist and famous non-violence promoter. Co-author 
of Damascus Declaration (2005) 
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Seif, Riad: CEO of Adidas’ division in Syria’s civil war and an entrepreneur of civil society 
initiatives, including various for a for discussing human rights. He was a strong critic of Ba’ath-
cronyism and totalitarianism and was arrested in 2008 for criticizing the government. Co-president 
of National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces. One of the main authors of the 
“Damascus Declaration”. (BBC News 2012) 
 
Sources: 
 
 BBC News 30.06.2012 Bashar al-Assad's inner circle BBC News last retrieved 19.12.2015 
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